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Abstract.
We study endogenous currency substitution in a decentralized trade environment. Sellers maximize profits from sales of imperfectly substitutable goods by posting prices in either one of two
currencies. A unique symmetric equilibrium exists where goods are priced only in the local currency. This occurs if foreign trade is sporadic, there is sufficient but not excessive liquidity, and
discounting is low. Excess or scarcity of liquidity, however, induces sellers to extract all surplus
from buyers. This destroys the monetary equilibrium and shuts down trade. Equilibria with
and without currency substitution coexist on some region of the parameter space, and may be
multiple. We prove that purchasing power parity may hold even if foreign trade is costly and
the currency's value differs across countries. International circulation of money may expand the
extent of the market hence enhance welfare.

(*) We gratefully acknowledge the financial support of Purdue's CIBER, and the Purdue Research
Foundation. Corresponding author Gcamera@mgmt.purdue.edu. Comments welcome.
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1. Introduction

We develop a theoretical study of the determinants of currency substitution in a two-country setting
where trade is decentralized and subject to frictions. By currency substitution we denote a situation in
which different currencies are used as media of exchange in an economy. 1 Ours is a study of its theoretical
underpinning, and it complements a umited number of recent work on multi-currency economies where
trade is decentralized and currencies are not primitives (see Matsuyama et Al, 1995, and Trejos and Wright,
1996a,b). We do so by means of a search-theoretic general equilibrium model where two types of inconvertible
and intrinsically worthless pieces of paper have value in equilibrium in that they can be exchanged for goods
whose consumption generates utility.
Because search-theoretic models have been so successful in describing how some fiat money can come to
be used in an economy, an obvious next step is to explain what economic parameters affect its acceptability
abroad. In particular we ask the following questions. Under what conditions will a foreign currency become
a domestic medium of exchange, how will prices be affected, and what are its welfare implications? Are
international trade frictions sufficient to cause departures from the law of one price? Can the return from
holding a currency differ across regions where its purchasing power is identical?
We show that it is the liquidity services provided by a currency (relative to another) that may induce
currency substitution. We also prove that, even in a stylized trade environment as ours, departures from
purchasing power parity are not necessarily due to the presence of decentralized exchange, inter-regional
trade impediments, or differing currency valuations. Rather, they appear to stem from pricing decisions of
profit maximizing sellers who sometimes may find it worthwhile to price discriminate against those buyers
holding a foreign currency. In fact, we prove that both currencies will complement each other as means
of payment within the same region when this improves the extent of the market, in which case they may
(or may not) be treated as perfect substitutes. This, in turn, implies that currency substitution may have
welfare enhancing effects when there is scarcity of local liquidity.

2. Multiple Currencies in Models of Decentralized Trade.
While the determinants of currency substitutions have been the subject of a number of studies (for a
survey see Giovannini and Turtleboom, 1992) the influential paper of Matsuyama et Al. (1995) has been
the first general equilibrium monetary model of decentralized trade to provide conditions for a currency
to circulate internationally, under the assumption of fixed terms of trade. Trejos and Wright (1996b), have
subsequently incorporated endogenous price determination to characterize the currencies' relative purchasing
a power in the presence of different amounts of liquidity, trade frictions, and monetary policies. 2 Crucial
I

Currency substitution, sometimes referred to as "dollarization", has been defined differently in the literature, ranging from

a very broad to a very narrow definition. For a survey see Calvo and Vegh (1996) and Giovannini and Turtleboom (1992).
2 Random matching environments have recently been used to study nominal exchange determination when currency exchange
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in their analysis is the assumption of a bargaining protocol according to which buyers (who hold indivisible
money) make a take-it-or-leave-it quantity offer to sellers (who have no money) who, consequently, receive
zero surplus in any trade (and zero lifetime utility).
While this simple pricing rule provides a good benchmark, it has some shortcomings and peculiar consequences for the existence of the equilibria. First, currency substitution is not an equilibrium unless the
countries are sufficiently identical economies. 3 Additionally, when both currencies circulate in both countries, prices are independent of the currency used and hinge exclusively on the seller's nationality. It follows
that currencies have always equal purchasing power within a country, but unequal purchasing power across
countries (unless they are identical economies). Surprisingly, these results are completely reversed when
currency substitution takes place only in one economy. In such a case purchasing power parity may hold
but only if the countries are not symmetric, and the two currencies will never be perfect substitutes in the
economy where both have value (the foreign currency having greater purchasing power). Finally, the value
of a currency (hence its purchasing power) is independent of the value of the competing money, even in
equilibria with currency substitution.
We address these shortcomings by adopting a different (and probably more reasonable) pricing protocol
based on the ordinary observation that in retail transactions it is the seller who chooses both the currency
in which to trade and the price(s) to post in his store. The analysis is carried out in a prototypical search
model where several types of sellers and buyers participate in random pairwise monetary exchange both
locally or across two different regions (or countries). Endogenous price formation is the result of sellers
choosing the prices to be posted in any currency they desire. A seller specializes in the production of one
type of good, and essentially acts as a specialty "store" attempting to maximize the profit from sales to
buyers which are homogenous across countries but rank goods differently. Buyers' type and nationality,
however, is unobserved so that stores may only take into account the currency offered, hence post prices to
maximize the profit from expected sales in each currency denomination. This can potentially generate price
discrimination over currencies, whereby different quantities of goods (or none at all) are sold for different
currencies.
The main consequence is that the purchasing power of a currency is a function of both its denomination
and the location of stores (domestic or foreign). We prove existence of equilibria where domestic stores post

prices in terms of both the national and the foreign currency (or vice-versa). In doing so, we confirm and
is also possible and prices are either endogenous (Craig and Waller, 1999, and Head and Shi, 1998), or exogenous (Zhou, 1997).
Craig and Waller, in particular, study optimal currency portfolios numerically and so not only are able to characterize the
distribution of currencies and prices, but also the distribution of nominal exchange rates.
30n the other hand, the bargaining protocol adopted implies that sellers would always be willing to accept any currency,
however small the associated return (see Trejos and Wright, 1996a). Hence world-wide currency substitution would be the only
equilibrium unless bargaining or other transaction costs (direct or indirect) are borne by sellers. But this complicates the model
substantially (as in Trejos and Wright, 1996b).
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extend the work of Trejos and Wright (1996a, b) by showing that prices are perfectly flexible and respond
to trade frictions and changes in the quantity of money in both countries. However, we prove that trade
frictions are not sufficient per se to generate purchasing power inequality across countries. In fact, we provide
conditions for the existence of a class of equilibria with both currency substitution and purchasing power
parity even with fundamentally different economies and substantial international trade frictions. In one
instance we show that the foreign currency may have identical purchasing power across countries, even if
it is valued more domestically than abroad, and even in the presence of "home good bias" (with domestic
stores giving discounts to buyers making a purchase with domestic currency). Because equilibria with local
and international currencies coexist, we also show that currency substitution may. lead to a welfare superior
outcome. 4
The contribution of this study, however, goes beyond proving existence of equilibria with currency substitution. By adopting a seller-posting-price protocol we also extend and complement previous work on
existence of monetary equilibria in search theoretic models of money with endogenous price formation (see
Trejos and Wright, 1995, Shi, 1995), with some novel results. Specifically, we find that, unlike nearly all
previous random matching models, symmetric monetary equilibria may exist only if the available amount
of currency is neither excessive nor too limited, and if individuals are sufficiently patient. Prices may be
efficient even in the presence of a positive discount factor, in the sense that there may be a quantity of money
such that the output sold is equivalent to the solution to a social planner's problem. We also find that prices
fall for a marginal increase in the measure of buyers because of the increased extent of the market faced by
sellers. A high degree of impatience or an excessively large proportion of buyers, however, would induce a
seller to increase prices and cater to a smaller segment of the demand for his good. Most remarkably, there is
a liquidity threshold beyond which sellers would charge premium prices with the intent to extract all surplus
from those buyers who have the highest valuation for the commodity offered. In a symmetric equilibrium,
this behavior would deprive money of value. This would also occur for limited amounts of currency, when
too infrequent sales would induce the posting of premium prices, even in the absence of time discounting.
We present the environment in the following section, and discuss the symmetric stationary equilibrium
strategies, value functions,and distribution of money in section 4. Section 5 focuses on equilibria with local
currencies, and currency substitution. Section 6 concludes.

3. Environment

Time is continuous and goes on forever. There is a continuum of individuals and goods of measure one.
4 Kocherlakota

and Krueger (1998), argue that it may be socially beneficial to have multiple national moneys. This is

obtained in a random matching model where preferences are defined over the nationality of goods. It follows that if preferences
are sufficiently heterogeneous over the different nationalities of goods, having two moneys leads to a Pareto superior allocation.
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Individuals and goods may originate from one of two countries, denoted by d E {D, F}: a fraction P < 1
of individuals belongs to the domestic economy, D, and the remaining fraction 1 - P lives in the foreign
economy, F. In each country there are N types of agents and N types (or sets) of goods, each of identical
proportion

it.

Let i E {I, .. , N} denote an individual of type i and let n E N := {I, .. , N} denote a good

belonging to set n.
Individuals derive different utility from each different subset (type) of goods available. All agents have the
same kind of cardinal preferences but their ordinal preferences over types of goods differ (see Deneckeree and
Rotschild (1992)) so that consumption of an identical quantity of different goods provides identical utility
to different agents, only if goods are identically ranked. For example, individ~als of two different types

derive the same utility from consumption of an identical quantity of their most preferred good, but their
preferences differ in the rank ordering of every type of commodity. For tractability we specify preferences
such that the resulting distribution over the rank ordering of good types is uniform, and symmetric. More
specifically, preferences of i are defined on the N sets of goods produced in the economy, with ranking defined
as monotonically decreasing in i

+k

(modulo N), for k

=

{O, .. , N -I}. That is, preferences over good types

are ordered clockwise so that individual i likes the most any good in the set n = i, and the least goods in
the set i - I (modulo N). The temporary utility of i from consumption of q units of good n is
(1)

where 'Y E (0,1),

ai,n

= ai+l,n+l Vi, n

(mod. N) and 1 =

ai,i

°

> ai,i+l > ... ai,N > ... ai,i-l = Vi (mod. N).

Here ai,n characterizes if 8 marginal valuation for good n, and captures the degree of differentiation of goods.
We will refer to "higher valuation" buyers as those individuals having larger ai,n, relative to buyer j =1= i. An
extreme case of this is the ordering of Kiyotaki and Wright (1989), where N = 3,

ai,n

= 1 if n = i, and zero

otherwise. Note that the resulting distribution over the rank ordering of goods is uniform and symmetric
across countries, types of individuals, and goods.
After having consumed, any agent i can produce q units of a perishable good of type i - I (mod. N)
suffering disutility c(q) = q. Initially a measure M E (0,1) of the population is randomly and identically
endowed with one unit of indivisible fiat money, domestic or foreign. We denote the initial supply of domestic
(foreign) currency by M D (MF), thus

MD+MF =M.

(2)

For the sake of tractability we impose a unit storage upper bound on money holdings, assume that production
cannot take place when holding money, and rule out free disposal (as in Kiyotaki and Wright, 1993). The
remaining 1 - M fraction of individuals is initially able to produce. Since own production does not provide
utility

(ai,i-l

= 0), exchange is required for consumption to take place, so we call buyers the agents with

money, and sellers the others. Let md

(m~)

be the proportion of domestic (foreign) traders with currency d.
5

Hence
(3)
m'=m~+m~

(4)

represent, respectively, the proportion of buyers in the domestic and foreign economy. In equilibrium, all
money must be held:
Pmd

+ (1- P)m~ = M d,

dE {D,F},

(5)

therefore a proportion 1 - m of domestic individuals are sellers (1 - m' in the foreign country). Since money
is identically distributed across types m (m') also denotes the proportion of domestic (foreign) buyers of
type i.
The economy suffers from an extreme restriction on coalition formation in that only bilateral matches are
allowed, hence each match experiences absence of double coincidence of wants (because of preferences and
technologies). While the partner's inventory and the actions taken in the match are perfectly observable,
trading histories are private information (a feature that rules out credit), and so are the type (Le. preferences)
and nationality. These last features will play a crucial role in the determination of prices, while the other
assumptions have the main implication that trade needs to be facilitated by money.
It is assumed that sellers are located at fixed points (see Burdett, Trejos and Wright, 1995 for a motivation

of this feature), while buyers search for sellers and meet them randomly and bilaterally at each date according
to a Poisson process with arrival rates which differ across countries: domestic (foreign) buyers meet domestic
sellers at rate aD

(a~),

and foreign sellers at rate a F

(a~).

Since the frequency of matches between traders

in country D and F must be identical to the frequency of matches between traders in country F and D,
then aF and

a~

must satisfy
PaF = (1 - P)a~.

For this reason we let
aD = Pk, aF = (1- P)k', a~ = (1- P)k, a~ = Pk'

(6)

which satisfy the restrictions above, where k' > 0 denotes the degree of economic integration between
countries, while k > 0 determines the matching rate within a country.s

4. Symmetric Stationary Equilibria

We consider stationary equilibria, where identical individuals adopt identical time-invariant strategies,
and where the distribution of objects is stationary. We will denote the foreign country by a prime, strategies
5These two parameters essentially control the ease of "local" versus "regional" exchange. We can choose P, k, and k' so
that, for instance, OlD

> OIF but

OI~

< OlD ' Le. in country D regional trade is more difficult that local, while the opposite

true for country F.
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is

by small Greek letters, the strategies of a specific individual by the corresponding capital letter, and equilibrium strategies and best responses by a star. Finally, we consider rational expectations equilibria where the
individual's conjecture of distributions is correct in equilibrium, and where the expected payoffs are based
on the correct evaluation of the probability and gains from trade.

4.1 Strategies and Prices
An individual i can be either a buyer or a seller depending on her holdings of currency. Contingent on her
state, she choose her actions in order to maximize the expected lifetime utility she derives from consumption
of goods. In doing so she takes as given the trade opportunities available in the economy, the strategies of
others, and the distribution of prices. If at date t she is a seller, her strategy encompasses two choices: (i)
which currency to accept and, contingent on that, (ii) the price(s) she intends to post. If she is a buyer,
her only relevant choice is whether to buy (at the specified price) the commodity offered by a randomly
encountered seller.
Specifically, consider a domestic seller i. At each date she chooses her strategy taking as given the
strategies of all others, the value functions, and the distribution money_ Recall also that she does not
observe type and nationality of he buyers she meets. Since she has to choose whether to sell in exchange for
currency, and what quantity to offer, we break her problem in two sub-components, moving backward. Let
Qd,i-l ;::: 0 denote her offer of commodity i - 1, contingent on the fact that she accepts currency d. In this

way we can denote by

Q/i-I

the price she posts in terms of the unit of currency d. Also let Q = {Qd,ihd,i

encompass the choices of quantities for each possible i, d combination (Q' when sellers are foreign). The
offers of all other sellers, taken as given, are represented by the vectors q = {qd,dvi,d, and q'

=

{q~,ihi,d.For

any given an quantity offer, let ITd be the probability that the domestic seller accepts currency d. 6 Let
IT

= {ITD' IT F }, and II' = {IT D,II~} if the seller is foreign. The acceptance strategies of

all others, are

denoted by 1r = {1r D, 1rF} and 1r' = {1rD' 1r~}.
Consider a domestic buyer i holding currency d. Given the quantity offered by a randomly encountered
domestic seller h, qd,h, buyer i chooses whether to buy or whether to pass on and wait for a better price
offer, a strategy we denote by Bd,i(qd,h) E [0,1]. In making her decision she takes as given the distribution of
prices in all other possible matches, the strategies of everyone else, the value functions, and the distribution of
money. Since buyer i can meet also foreign sellers, we defined the domestic (foreign) buyer's strategy vector
B = {B d i(qd h), B d i(tid h)}
"

"'ti,h,d

(B'). The strategies of all other domestic (foreign) buyers are denoted by

6Note that we do not need to index IT d by the seller's type, i, since we concentrate on symmetric equilibria, were sellers adopt
identical strategies, indipendent of their type. We can do so because of the symmetry imposed on preferences, distribution
of types i, and sets of goods. Note also that the strategy is non-discriminatory, since if seller i sells in exchange for one unit
of currency d to a domestic buyer, he will also sell to a foreign buyer for the same amount of currency, given that buyers'
nationality is private information.
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{3 = {{3d,i(qd,h),{3d,i(q~,h) Li'h'd ({3'). Finally, let j3 = {{3,{3'}, B

= {B,B'},

11'

= {7l",7l"'},

II

= {ll,ll'},

q

=

{q,q'}, and Q = {Q,Q'}.

4.2 Distribution of money
Consider the domestic country. The distribution of money holdings of currency d in that country, is
stationary when the inflow of domestic sellers, who have received one unit of d (from foreign or domestic
buyers) in exchange for their good, is equal to the outflow of domestic buyers who have bought some good
(either in the domestic economy or abroad) with their currency d. This implies that in a symmetric strategy
equilibrium, the law of motion for d E {D,F} must satisfy

md == L
iEN

~7l"d(I- m) [O:Dmd L ~(3d,h(qd,i-l) + O:Fm~ L ~(3~:h(qd'i-l)]
hEN

(7)

hEN

- L ~md [O:D(I- m)7l"d L ~(3d'i(qd,h) + O:F(I - m')7l"~· L ~(3d'i(q~:h)]
iEN

hEN

hEN

for domestic holders of currency d. For a foreign holder of currency d the law of motion is
(8)

In a stationary equilibrium

md = m~ = 0

(9)

Vd.

The explanation of the law of motion is simple. Consider (7), for instance. The proportion of domestic
individuals holding currency d increases when a domestic seller finds it worthwhile to exchanges his good
for the currency d held by either a domestic or a foreign buyer, in which case the seller sets 7l"d = 1. Since
there is a proportion

11 of each type i

of sellers,

L 11(1 - m)

is the proportion of domestic sellers. They

iEN

can meet domestic buyers of type h who hold currency d, at rate O:Dmd-tt. These buyers agree to trade
if (3d,h(q;t,i-l) = 1. Since there are N types of buyers who might want to purchase the good sold by any
seller i at price qd,~-l then O:DmdLhEN 11{3d,h(q;t,i-l) represents the rate at which seller i meets buyers
with currency d and willing to buy. Similar considerations can be made for matches with foreign buyers
holding currency d. Hence the first line of (7) yields the total inflow of domestic sellers into domestic buyers
with currency d. Now consider the second line. The proportion of domestic individuals holding currency
d decreases when they buy some good h from either domestic or foreign sellers. There is a proportion

!!Jf

of domestic individuals of type i holding money. They meet a domestic seller h at rate O:D(I - m)-k. He
is willing to sell for currency d if 7l"d

= 1,

and buyer i buys if (3d,i(Qd,h)

8

= 1.

Since there are N types of

sellers, then

aD (1

- m )7I"d LhEN

-k (3d,i (qd,h)

is the rate at which a domestic buyer with currency d buys

from domestic sellers. By adding all transactions with foreign sellers, yields the second line of (7) which thus
represents the total outflow of domestic buyers with currency d, at each point in time.
Observe that the equations above simplify somewhat in a stationary symmetric equilibrium. Consider
once again (7). The rates at which domestic sellers trade with domestic buyers holding currency d (part
of the first line), and the rate at which domestic buyers holding currency d trade with domestic sellers
(part of the second line) cancel out in equilibrium, since they are identical (domestic buyers and sellers
just swap positions on who's holding currency d). Additionally, some multiplicative terms common to both
remaining terms can be factored out, hence cancel out in the steady state (a F k): The same occurs for the
two summations over i,since in a symmetric equilibrium
and

L
iEN

.L
IE N

k LhEN .B~~h(qd,i-l) = N -k LhEN (3~~h(qd,i-l)

k LhEN (3d,i(q~:h) = N k LhEN (3d,i(q~:h) for all i. Thus in a symmetric equilibrium equations (7)

and (8) imply, respectively,
md ex:

71";(1 - m)m~

L

(3~~h(qd,i-l) -

md(1 -

m')71"~·

hEN

m~ ex: 7I"~·(1-

m')md

L

L

(3d)q~~h)

(10)

(3~:i(qd,h)'

(11)

hEN

(3d,h(q~:i-l) - m~(1- m)7I"d

hEN

L
hEN

Finally, let m = {md' m~} dE{D,F} denote the steady state equilibrium vector of the proportion of money
traders in the economy.

4.3. Value Functions
In equilibrium, a domestic seller i choose his strategy in order to maximize his expected discounted

lifetime utility. Let Vs,i and Vd,i denote the stationary expected lifetime utility of, respectively, a domestic
seller and buyer i with currency d (a prime denotes a foreign individual). Taking as given the equilibrium
strategies of all others,

1T'., {3., q., and the distribution of money,

must satisfy

for a domestic seller i, and

for a foreign seller i.

9

m, seller's i steady state value function

Similarly, for a domestic buyer i holding currency d, her steady state value function must satisfy
(14)

while for a foreign buyer holding currency d her steady state value function must satisfy
r TT'
Yd i = ""'
L...J
,

max

hEN B~.i(qd.h)

+ ""'
L...J

max

0

ID (1 -N m) 11"d.B'd i (qd• h) [TTl
Ys i + Ui (qd. h) - TTl]
Yd i

hEN B~.i(q~7h)

(15)

" ' "

I.

I. )

I (1-Nm/) 1I"d B,di (qdh [TTl
'.) '- TTl]
Ysi+Ui (qdh
Ydi

OF

" ' "

For instance, consider (12). A domestic seller of type i maximizes his expected discounted lifetime utility

= 1)

the price

at which he intends to sell his good, that is how much to produce in exchange for one unit of d

(Qd,i-l).

by choosing (i) whether or not to accept currency d, and (ii) given that he accepts it (II d

Since the nationality of the buyer is private information the seller cannot discriminate across buyers, even
if buyers of different nationalities may be willing to pay different prices. In posting his price the seller
considers the expected profit, i.e. he will consider the expected demand from both domestic and foreign
buyers. He may decide to charge a high price and capture only part of the world demand for his type of
good, or charge a lower price, and sell to a larger subset of buyers. The functional equations shows that the
seller meets a domestic buyer h holding currency d at rate
the posted price,
Vd,i -

Qd,i-l -

state, Vd,i

f3~,h(Qd,i-l)

lfa,i,

-lfa,i'

The buyer h agrees to buy good i-I at

ODmd1t.

= 1, only if he weakly prefers it to walking away. In that case the seller nets

since the seller suffers a production costs Qd,i-b and acquires currency d thus changing

A similar gain is made when the seller meets a foreign buyer h with currency d and who is

willing to buy.
Equation (14) describes the lifetime utility of a domestic buyer of type i holding currency d. She maximizes
her lifetime utility by deciding whether to buy the goods offered, at the prices posted. She can buy both
from domestic and from foreign sellers. meets She meets a domestic seller offering
exchange for currency d at rate
and if the price

+

qd.h

oD(1- m)1t1l"d'

q~,h

units of good h in

If consumption of good h yields positive utility to buyer i,

is not too large, buyer i will obtain a non-negative trade surplus from the transaction,

in which case she will accept by setting Bd,i(qd,h) = 1. Her flow payoff is given by the sum of the utility from
consumption of the offered quantity of good h, Ui(qd,h)' plus the net continuation payoff lfa,i
changes state (from buyer to seller). Finally, let V = {Vs
steady state value functions.

4.4 Equilibrium Strategies and Prices
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i, V;,

,

i'

Vd i, VJ
'

i}

'iEN,dE{D,F}

-

Vd,i since he

denote the vector of

We now discuss the equilibrium strategies of a representative individual (the case of a foreign trader is
similar). Note that in choosing her optimal strategy as a buyer or a seller, the representative individual
takes as given prices in all other matches, q, strategies of all others,

11"

and B, distribution of money, m, and

value functions, V. Recall also that we consider rational expectations equilibria where individual actions are
based on the correct evaluation of the gains from trade in each possible match.
Buyer. In a random match with a seller h, a domestic buyer i holding currency d accepts to buy

commodity h at the posted price

- 1q
d.h

onJ:y if her gains from trade are positive, and she rejects it otherwise

so that Bd,i(qd,h) E {O,I}.7 Specifically, her best response to the price offer of any randomly encountered
domestic seller must satisfy
if V.S,'. + U·(qd
" , h) - v'd ,t. >
_ 0

(16)

otherwise.
Encounters with foreign sellers elicit identical responses, in which case

q~ ,h

is the argument of (16). In a

symmetric stationary equilibrium
(3* = B*.

(17)

Seller. At each date domestic seller i chooses which currencies to accept and the quantities he is willing

to produce in exchange. He does so to maximize his expected profit from trade. We find it convenient to
subdivide the seller's problem in two sub-components, moving backward.
(a) Contingent on accepting currency d, lId = 1, seller i chooses the quantity offer Qd,i-l. The existence of
private information over buyers' nationality and type implies the seller cannot observe buyers' ranking
of preferences over the commodity offered, and their overall valuation of the trade proposed. Therefore
i cannot extract the entire surplus from each buyer encountered, in general, but only from buyers of

one specific type and nationality. In particular, seller i will choose Qd,i-l in order to maximize the
expected profit from sales denominated in currency d

n(Qd,i-l) ==

[aD";: L (3d,h(Qd,i-l) + aF '":v~ L (3~'h(Qd'i-d] (Vd,i hEN

hEN

Qd,i-l -

~,i)'

(18)

Equation (18) shows that sales to both domestic and foreign buyers (holding currency d) contribute,
in general, to i's expected profit O(Qd,i-I)' Since different types of buyers like good i - I in different
degrees (Le. ah,i-l) the seller faces a trade-off in choosing Qd,i-l. A higher price (lower Qd,i-t}
increases his net payoff in each single transaction, since Vd,i - Qd,i-l - Vs,i would grow for any given
V, but may also induce some buyers to abstain from the purchase (see (16)) which would decrease the
7 Consideration

of only pure strategies is without loss of generality since sellers csn always induce" marginal" buyers to buy,

by posting a price which leaves "marginal" buyers an

E:

> 0 small

be clear in the following subsection.
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payoff. This is due to perfect divisibility of goods, as it will

L [aD~.6d,h(Qd,i-l) + aF!!ff.6~,h(Qd,i-d],

expected demand

and expected profit. In particular,

hEN

(16) implies that any Qd,i-l leaving buyer h with an arbitrarily small surplus will be accepted. Hence
we define the set of all possible offers Qd,i-l that will leave exactly one type of buyer (domestic or
foreign) with zero trade surplus, and all others with strictly positive or negative surpluses:
Xd,i-l

==

{Qd,i-l ~ OIVs,h

+ Uh (Qd,i-l) - Vd,h

= 0 or V;,h

+ Uh (Qd,i-l) - V~,h

= 0, Vh =1=

i}.

(19)

This is a discrete set containing at most (N - 1)2 elements (there are N - 1 types of buyers in each
country, but since offers must be non-negative the set may be smaller).
In the appendix we formalize the fact that a necessary condition for Qd,i-l to be optimal, is that at
least one type of buyer h gets zero surplus (in the limit). Offers that leave all buyers with a positive
surplus are suboptimal, since they do not increase the probability of a sale, while raising production
costs in all possible trades. Consequently we refer to Xd,i-l as the seller's choice set for Qd,i-l (foreign
sellers choose Q~,i-l E X~,i-l)' It follows that, contingent on II d = 1, the optimal quantity offer of
domestic seller i, Qd,i-l' must maximize expected profits, i.e.
Qd,i-l

== {

I

{Q.d'i-l E Xd,i-l O(Qd,i-d

o

~ O(Qd,i-l),

VQd,i-l E Xd,i-dQd,i-l }

(20)

If O(Qd,i-l) ~ 0, VQd,i-l E Xd,i-l

(O/(Q~\_l)
for a foreign seller). We stress two features of Q d,i - I ' First, while (20) does not imply
,
uniqueness of Qd,i-l (since offers are defined on a discrete set), we focus on unique offers resolving
all ties in favor of the largest candidate. s Second, since (20) specifies offers conditional on II d = 1,
once the offer is posted the seller has to sell for currency d. In case no offers in Xd,i-l are feasible (i.e.
generate positive profits), the only feasible profit-maximizing offer is

Q:t ,i - I

= O. This is equivalent to

set IId = 0. 9 Finally, symmetry requires that domestic sellers of the same type charge identical prices,
Q* =q*.

(21)

(b) We now discuss domestic seller's i decision of which currency to accept, II d E {0,1}.10 While the
quantity offer depends in part on the arrival rates of matches with different type of buyers, II d does
81f n(Qd,i-l) is ~onvex, in principle there can be two offers arg min{Xd.i_d, and arg max{Xd,i_d, that can satisfy (20).
If n(Qd,i-l) is concave there may be two adjacent offers in Xd,i-l' that can satisfy (20). However, given the discreteness of

the choice set, this event has a small probability of occurrence (we never encountered it in the numerical simulations). This
is generally not equivalent to asymmetric equilibria where different fractions of sellers post different prices but have the same
expected profit. It is easy to show that equilbria of this type exist (and exercise along these lines is contained in Soller and
Wright, 1999).
9In equilibrium, II d

=

°

and Qd,i-l

> 0 are

inconsistent: either the profit to the seller is non-positive, hence Qd,i-l

=

°,

or if it is positive, then II d= 1.
laThe mixed strategy IId E (0,1) is not a symmetric equilibrium if Qd,i-l leaves positive surplus to some buyer type. The
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not. l l Recall that seller i correctly evaluate his surplus from a sale, Vd,i - Qd,i-I - \'s,i, but once
matched to a buyer with d his uncertainty about the buyer's type and nationality is still unresolved.
Thus, i would sell only if his expected trade surplus is strictly positive for some quantity offer among
the ones which some buyers would find acceptable. 12 Conditional having encountered a buyer with
currency d, the conditional probability that the buyer is domestic (foreign) is Pmd/Md
thus the expected surplus from selling at price

Q/'-l

((l-P)m~/Md),

is

If we let min Xd,i-I denote the smallest element of Xd,i-l' then seller's i best response must satisfy

II~ =

{I if S(Qd,i-l) > 0 for some Qd,i-l ;::: minXd,i-I

o

(22)

otherwise.

That is to say, in the subgame where a match with a buyer holding currency d has taken place, a
domestic seller will post a price in terms of currency d only if he believes there is a positive probability
that the buyer met may want to accept his offer. If the seller believes that there is no price at
which trade could be mutually advantageous, then he won't post any. This occurs when there is
no feasible price capable of generating a positive payoff from the sale (Vd,i - Qd,i-I - \'s,i :::; 0 for all
Qd,i-l ;::: minXd,i-I). It also occurs when the seller assigns zero-probability to the event that the buyer

met is willing to accept any of the prices the store chooses from, given the distribution of currencies
across countries. 13 In either case S(Qd,i-l) :::; 0 and not accepting d is the best option, so that we
seller could offer a bit less, say Qd,i-lo would still be able to sell to some buyers, and do better by obtaining a positive surplus:

Vd,; - Qd,;-1 - V.,;

> Vd,;

- Qd,;-1 - V." = O.

If Qd,i-1 leavse zero surplus to both buyers and sellers a mixed strategy TId could be supported only if currency d were to

be accepted with probability one in the other country. An uninteresting case since d currency trades in this case would not
contribute at all to the lifetime value of holding it, in the country where the mixed strategy is an equilibrium.
II If, for instance, seller i expected to meet no buyers with d, he would not to post a price I/Qd,i-1' However, strategies must
be subgame perfect. Thus should he meet a buyer with d, the seller should decide whether to accept the currency, for some
Qd,i-1'

121f the seller could recognize type and nationality of buyers then he would only consider the surplus in choosing TId. This
would make a difference in the out-of-equilibrium occurrence where the seller meets someone who (according to the conjectured
distribution of money) was not expected to be holding that particular currency. For instance, suppose that currency F is not
accepted (hence circulating) in the domestic economy, and that the seller meets a domestic buyer with F (out of equilibrium).
Suppose also that there is an offer which is mutually advantageous. Since the seller attaches zero probability to the event of
having met a domestic buyer with F, then the best he can do is to reject F.
13This is a consequence of the unobservability of buyers' nationality. For instance, suppose a US store would sell to a US
customer offering yen. If they assign zero probability to the event that the customer met is a US citizen, however, the store
would choose yen-denominated prices only under the conjecture of having encountered a Japanese citizen. If there are no feasible

13

write Qd,i-l

= 0 when n d = 0, with no loss in generality.14

n" =

In a symmetric equilibrium
(23)

?T".

4.5 Equilibrium
We can now discuss the equilibrium. Since we focus on Nash best responses, and equilibrium outcome in
this environment must be such that production and trading decisions are individually optimal given correctly
perceived strategies and distribution of money. Additionally, since we focus only on stationary outcomes
where strategies are symmetric, equilibrium production and trading decisions must be time-invariant and
identical for individuals of identical type. Finally, because of the assumption of rational expectations, the
equilibrium pricing rule adopted must be based on the correct evaluation of gains from trade.
That is, a symmetric stationary monetary equilibrium is a list of strategy vectors

{.B", 1r"} , production

decisions vectors, q", a vector of proportions of money traders, m, and a vector of value functions V such
that:
i) individuals maximize their expected lifetime utilities using symmetric Nash strategies, Le. given

{.B* ,1r"}

and m, V must satisfy (12)-(15), {B, n} must satisfy the best response functions (16)-(17) and (22)(23), and Q must satisfy the condition for maximization of expected profits (20)-(21),

ii) the distribution of money is stationary, i.e. given V and {J3Oo, 1r"} , m satisfies the stationarity conditions
(7) through (9).
Some features of the equilibrium are worth noticing at this point. First, all sellers belonging to the same
country in equilibrium choose an identical price in terms of one specific currency, independent of their type
i. This is because the demand for commodity i - I depends on preferences of buyers, but types are uniformly

distributed over N, and the ordering of preferences and production is symmetric, so that all sellers located
in any given country, face exactly the same expected demand schedule, irrespective of their production. 15
Consequently, in a given country the equilibrium price of goods i

#- j

must be identical, so that with no loss

in generality we can drop the subscript i - I and let

(24)
prices at which a yen-denominated trade with a Japanese can occur, then the US store would not post any yen-denominated
prices at all.
14Mixed strategies

7Td

can be formally ruled out by assuming the existence of a menu-cost e

>0

(the cost of posting prices),

and then looking at the limiting case when e -+ O.
lSFor a given price, the expected demand for good i - I is a function of the location of the seller (domestic of foreign), because
of possible differences in the arrival rates of buyers.

14

Vi E N, and d E {D, F}. Within a country, (24) implies that the equilibrium value functions must be identical

across types i, i.e.
(25)
Vi EN, and d E {D, F}. Notice, however, that V;

(VD and Vs

(Vd ) need not be equal, and that arrival rates

for buyers need not be identical across countries. For this reason, the equilibrium price of good i - I , and
buyer's strategies are not necessarily equal across countries.

5. A Simple Class of Symmetric Equilibria
We now discuss the existence of a simple class of symmetric equilibria, simple in that each store optimally
chooses to post prices which will result in a purchase by any buyer who has a positive marginal valuation
for the commodity offered and has the currency in which the price is posted. We confine our investigation
to the three most interesting types of symmetric Nash equilibria: (i) the case in which the two currencies
circulate only locally, (ii) outcomes where currency substitution occurs only in one country so that one
currency circulates internationally and one locally, and (iii) equilibria where currency substitution occurs in
both countries in which case both currencies circulate internationally.16 To limit the dimensionality of the
state space and the complexity of the treatment we set N
so that we denote by ij

= a~ <

= 3. We define p = rN, and let ai,HI = a E (0,1),

1 that q which satisfies (aq)'Y - q

= 0.

In what follows we focus the

discussion on domestic agents, where no confusion arises.

5.1 Local Currencies
We start with the discussion of the case where the currencies circulate only locally, that is to say that
currency d is accepted in exchange for goods only in country d. We conjecture an equilibrium in which
domestic (foreign) stores do not accept currency F (D), but only their national currency, that is
(26)

Using (26) and (3)-(4) for M D < P < 1 - M F , the equilibrium distribution of money holdings is:
I
MD
I
I
MF
mF=mD=O, m=mD=p' m =mF= I-P'

(27)

Since domestic seller i does not post prices in terms of currency F (we will verify it shortly), QD,i-I
is the only relevant choice. Recalling that m~ = 0, and N = 3, the choice set XD,i-I contains only two
quantities, i.e.
XD,i-l
16 Obviously,

== {QD,i-ll

Vs,i-I

+ Ui-I(QD,i-t} -

VD,i-I

= 0,

Va,HI

+ Ui+I(QD,i-t} -

VD,Hl

= O}.

there always exists a non-monetary equilibrium where none of the currencies are accepted. There also exist

equilibria where one currency is never accepted, while the other circulates locally or internationally.

15

This implies the possibility of posting two prices. A high price which leaves zero surplus to domestic buyers

i-I, the ones who have the highest valuation for good i-I (ai-l,i-l = 1). At this price no other type
would buy. Because of (1), type i would not wish to consume any quantity of good i-I (she derives no
utility from it, since Cli,i-l = 0), while type i + 1 would sustain only a net loss since she has a lower valuation
than buyer i-I (ai+l,i-l = a
to purchase the good. Since i

< 1). A low price at which domestic buyers i-I and i + 1 are both willing

+ 1 likes the good the least, this lower price takes away her entire surplus.

We can rule out the high price, otherwise the trade surplus generated in each transaction would entirely
go to sellers. This would imply VD,i

= 0 for

any buyer i, because under the conjectured strategy buyers

would not be able to buy anywhere else. This contradicts the conjectured

o < ~ < VD.

equili~rium

valuation of money,

Therefore, the low price is the unique profit maximizing choice for any seller i, and using (1),

(21), (24), and (25), it must satisfy
VB

+ (aqiJr

(28)

- VD = O.

It follows that only buyer i receives positive surplus from purchases of goods i, and

13iJ,i(qiJ,h) = 1,

hE {i, i

+ I},

(29)

(and zero otherwise) is the equilibrium strategy for any i.
Using (26), (27), (28), and (29) the value function of any domestic seller i in equilibrium must satisfy
(30)

where we note that in equilibrium a domestic seller expects no matches with domestic buyers holding foreign
currency (mF = 0), or foreign buyers with domestic currency
pVD = oD(I- mD) [~

(m~

+ (qiJP -

= 0). Similarly, (14) implies
(31)

VD ].

Proposition 1. A unique equilibrium where currencies circulate only locally exists if q" satisfies

.. _ {a'Y [p + oD(1

qD -

' .. _ {a'Y [p + 0F(1
qF -

+ m)]- oD(1 -

-L-

m)} 1-..,

2moD

,

....L

+ m')] - 0F(1 - m')} .-..,
2m'o'F

m satisfies (27), and the following sufficient conditions hold:
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,

where

1 - a'Y __ (2 - a)(1 - a'Y) _
.
m= l+a'Y' m= 2-a(l+a'Y) , p=mm{PD,PF},
_

O:D

PD =

0:_ F =

[maI+'Y + (2 - a) (1 - m - a'Y)]
_ o:~ [m'aI+'Y + (2 - a) (1 - m' - a'Y)]
(2':-' a)a'Y
' PF =
(2 _ a)a'Y

20:Dm [(aq*D )'Y - q*]
D + paq'*
F
m') (q;r
+ a'Y - 2a'Y (q~)l-'Y]'

(1 _

[1

_ _
20:'F m' [(aq'*)'Y
0:'
F - q'*]
F + paq*D
D = (1 - m) (qh)'Y
+ a'Y - 2a'Y (qh)l-'Y] .

[1

Proof. In Appendix.

We provide intuition by considering the actions taken by a representative domef!tic individual. Recall that
in this equilibrium all sellers i must post the low price l/qh so that all buyers who have a positive valuation
for commodity i - I buy (types i -1 and i). The problem is that substantial differentiation (small a) requires
sellers to incur large production costs, since a substantial quantity must be delivered in each sale to both
low and high valuation buyers. Since money can be spent only the period following a sale, sellers cannot be
too impatient and a low discounting factor is necessary for the low price to be an equilibrium (p

~

p ).

The

frequency of transactions (governed by amount of money and arrival rates) has also implications for the price
chosen. In particular, the smaller the price posted the larger must be the frequency of trade for the store to
keep posting the low price. Since trade matches are proportional to the measure of buyers, enough liquidity
is necessary, m > m (note that m

--+

1 as a

--+

0). If liquidity were too limited, or sellers too impatient,

the representative store would have an incentive to deviate from the proposed "low price". Expected profits
could be increased if all surplus were to be extracted from the high-valuation buyers, by posting premium
prices. This would decrease the frequency of sales but would also generate extra return (1 - a)qh per sale.
If all stores were to post such high prices no buyer would enjoy a positive trade surplus and money would

be valueless. A similar argument explains why m < in is necessary: an excessive measure of buyers would
also induce stores to exploit the trade off between higher prices and lower frequency of sales. I7
Finally stores won't post prices in terms of the foreign currency whenever that money is perceived to
be a bad medium of exchange. Since stores know that the foreign currency is not accepted in domestic
transactions, the return from deviating and accepting it is a function only of the ease of international trade.
If the latter is sufficiently small,

O:F

<

CtF,

selling for the foreign currency would be a dominated action,

even when asking for premium prices.

Corollary 1. Suppose an equilibrium with two local currencies exists. A marginal increase in the initial

level of the domestic (foreign) money supply will lower domestic (foreign) prices. Prices will be efficient if
17In the prototypical search models of money and prices (Shi, 1995, and Trejos and Wright, 1995) a = 0 in which case
!!!, m ~

1. Thus money would not be valued if sellers were posting prices, which explains the common assumption of buyers

making take-it-or-leave-it offers, or Nash bargaining with equal weights.
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m = me and m' = m'e, where

(aD + p) [aD - a'Y(aD + p)]
= aD [(aD + p)(1 + a'Y - 27) + ')'1'

e _

m

(a~ + p) [a~ - a'Y(a~ + p)J
= a~ [(a~ + p)(1 + a'Y - 27) + 7]'

'e _

m

Proof: In appendix.

The fact that prices are decreasing in the initial stock of the money supply, in equilibrium, is not strange
as it may appear at first blush.

Consider for a moment the case k' = 0 where only local exchange is

possible. We have seen that the representative store would take advantage of a very "liquid" economy by
price discriminating and attempting to sell only to high valuation buyers. FOI: this reason a symmetric
monetary equilibrium can exist only when stores do not meet buyers too frequently, that is to say when
there isn't excessive liquidity in circulation. Because of this limited frequency of sales, each store maximizes
profits by posting low prices thus selling to as many buyers as possible. A marginal increase in the initial
stock of money increases the measure of buyers (relative to sellers) and so increases the return from being
a seller. It also increases the return from holding money because it boosts the frequency of trade matches.
It follows that stores must offer better prices to low-valuation customers to induce a purchase. As m keeps
increasing, however, stores can take advantage of the trade-off between prices and frequency of sale, and
start charging premium prices. The problem is that by charging higher prices domestic money would lose
its value (taking strategies and prices in all other matches as given), since all domestic buyers who make
a purchase would be left with no surplus. Because of the discreteness of the support of the distribution of
types, and the existence of only high and low valuation agents, this would lead to a "jump" in prices which
would destroy the symmetric monetary equilibrium. IS
Additionally, the prices posted by stores may be efficient, in that the quantities exchanged solves the
problem of a planner who intends to maximizes the ex-ante lifetime utility in each country when he takes as
given the pricing protocol. We note that this result does not require the absence of time discounting (as in
Trejos and Wright, 1995), rather it hinges on the existence of an optimal quantity of liquidity.
Our findings are illustrated by means of numerical example in which countries are taken to be very
different economies. 19 The white rectangle in figure 1 delimits the space

MDXMF

on which the equilibrium

in which both currencies circulate only locally. As noted before, too little liquidity implies that there are not
enough buyers. The limited frequency of trade induces stores to extract all surplus from the high valuation
buyers. By doing so, however, the monetary equilibrium ceases to exist. An increase in the supply of local
currency makes local trade easier and lowers local prices (but does not influence the trade or prices in the
18 In a more general environment where N
equilibrium ceased to exist.
190ur benchmark is T = 0.1, P

0.1875

> OF

> 3 an increase in

MD would cause a sequence of jumps in prices until the monetary

= 0.75, "y = 0.9, = 0.8, k = 10, and k' = 0.25.
(l

= 0.0625.
18

In this case

0D

= 7.5 > of = 2.5 > o~ =

other economy), until the liquidity level does not exceed an upper bound. Note also that since the domestic
economy is three times larger than the foreign, the stock of money that can be circulated domestically is
larger than the foreign stock (hence the region of existence is shaped as a narrow rectangle).

5.2 One International Currency
In this section we consider equilibria where only domestic stores post prices in both currencies, while
foreign stores accept solely their national currency,

11"0 = 1I"F = 11"'; = 1, 11"'0 = o.

(32)

Because only domestic stores sell for currency D, some buyer i with currency D must receive a positive
surplus from trade, otherwise VD,i = 0 for all i and currency D would have no value.

Therefore the

equilibrium QD,i must still satisfy (28) Vi. This does not apply to QF,i because domestic stores sell to both
domestic and foreign buyers with F, hence in choosing QF,i domestic seller i

+ 1 considers also the foreign

demand. Since in general V =I- V', four possible quantity offers can be posted (two per nationality) which
satisfy
XF,i

== {QF,illts,i + Ui(QF,i) - VF,i = 0, V5 ,i-l + Ui-l(QF,i) - VF,i-l = 0,
V:,i

+ Ui(QF,i)

- V;,i

= 0,

V:,i_l

+ Ui-l(QF,d

- V;,i-l

(33)

= O}.

We cannot rule out any of these quantities, a priori, not even the smallest QF,i at which one buyer
type of only one country buys. This because even if all gains from trade go to the domestic seller the
buyer may still be able to get a positive payoff from foreign purchases. The discussion for the quantity
offer of any foreign seller i

+ 1 is identical and so is her choice set,

XF,i

== XF,i (where QF,i replaces QF,i)'

Note that qF,i need not necessarily equal q';,i and there are multiple price vectors which can potentially be
equilibria. Furthermore, since a buyer's gains from trade generally depend on the store's nationality, the
buyer's strategies will in general be a function of both their nationality (i.e. B =I- B'), and the nationality of
stores (i.e. BF,h(qF,i) =I- B F,h(q';,i))·20
The number of possible equilibria is greatly reduced when we consider the simple class of equilibria where
every store sells to every buyer who desires the good (and has the right currency). This implies that stores
in both countries post an identical lowest price in currency F, and since XF,i == XF,i the associated quantity
offer must satisfy
such that

Ui-l (qF,i)

= max {VF,i-l - lts,i-ll V;,i-l - V:,i-l} Vi.

20There are sixteen possible equilibrium vectors q., where

qi:>

(34)

is uniquely determined by (28). Each of these has implications

for the strategies of buyers. We will give numerical examples of this multiplicity of outcomes.
One of these proposed equilibria, however, can be ruled out. Namely, the case where sellers in both countries post the highest
price in terms of F (in which case VF,i

= V;',i = 0, and currency
19

F is not valued).

It follows that in equilibrium agents h E {i - 2, i-I} holding F will buy from both domestic and foreign

sellers i,

(35)
and since qh satisfies (28)

(36)
When
imply m~

7r'"

satisfies (32), qj;. satisfies (34), {3'" satisfies (35)-(36), and M D < P, (7)-(9) and (5) with d = D

= 0,

m~

= m ' , and

mD

=

~. Determination of mF and m ' is accomplished by solving the

system of two equations (5) and (7) for d = F

(I - m)(aDmF + aFm~) - mF[av(l- m)
{ M F = (1 - P)m~ + PmF'

+ aF(l -

m ' )] =

°

Using (4) the stationary distribution of money is
mF

=

MF(P-MD )
I
P(l- M ) E (0,1), m F
D

MF
M

= 1_

D

E

(0,1), mD

MD

=p

I

E

(0,1), m D

= 0.

(37)

Given the conjectured equilibrium strategies (32) and (35)-(36), prices (34), the distribution of money
holdings (37), we define the value functions. Equations (1) and (12)-(13) imply
(38)

(39)
while (14)-(15) in equilibrium imply
pVD = aD(l - m) [VS

pVF = [aD(l - m)

+ aF(l -

pV;" = [a~(l - m)

+ a~(l -

m~)]

m~)]

+ (qh)'Y - VD].

r + (aqj;. )'Y]

(41)

- V;") + (qj;.)'Y + (aqj;. )'Y].

(42)

[2 (V. - VF) + (qj;.

[2 (V;

(40)

To find the equilibrium quantities recall that qh is uniquely determined by (28), and we are considering
equilibria where (34) holds. Unfortunately (41) and (42) do not tell us the relative size of VF - Vs vs. V;" - V;
so the pricing rule is not uniquely identified.
Since currency F is the international currency, we focus on a subset of the simple class of equilibria
here considered. Namely, we conjecture (and then verify) the existence of an equilibrium where currency F
generates the largest net return to domestic sellers, i.e.
VF - V. ~ V;" - V;

20

> 0,

(43)

so that (34) implies
(44)
Using (44) and defining the following positive constants

bl == P + Cl:D (1

+ mv -

mF), ~

CI ==p+ Cl:D (1- mD +mF)

d l == P + 2Cl:~ (1 - mD)

== Cl:D(l

- m),

+ Cl:F(l +m~),

+ 2Cl:~,

d2

==

bJ == 2Cl:DmD,

C2 == Cl:D(l- m)

[Cl:~(1 - m)

+ Cl:~(1 -

b4 == 2 (Cl:DmF

+ Cl:Fm~)

+ Cl:F(l- m~),

m~)] (1

+ a'Y),

da == 2 (Cl:~mF

+ Cl:~m~),

then (38), and (40)-(42) imply
(45)
(46)
(47)
The right hand side of (47) is positive for all q'F > 0, but from (46)-(47) it is not clear whether VF - V s

~

V;" - V;, hence to find the equilibrium we proceed as follows in subsequent steps. First, we provide conditions
under which there is a unique pair {q1, q'F} which solves the system (45)-(46). Then, using (47), we provide
sufficient conditions for (43) to hold. Finally we provide conditions guaranteeing sellers' maximization of
profits.
Using (28) and (44) the system (45)-(46) reduces to
(qD)'Y

[a-'b63-b.] + ~ [(aqF)'Y -

qF] = qD

{ (qF)'Y

[a-'c64-c. ] + ~ [(aqDf -

qD]

(48)

= qF·

The system of equations (48) defines a map which has a fixed point qD

=

qF

=

0 corresponding to the

non-monetary equilibrium. Under certain conditions, it also has a unique positive fixed point {q1, q'F}, as
specified in the following lemma.

Lemma 1. The map defined by (48) has a unique fixed point {q1,q'F} E (0,q)2, if

where:

--L.

(a'Y CI qF =
b4
•

a'Y(p
u =
(
a'Y p
r: _

+ C2) J.._) + Vol

C2
J.._

Vol

C2

baO)
+ a'Y
~

1--,

+ bJo-,

•

_ ~(bJ + b4 ) 0
_ ( C2 )
> , PH = C2 - Vol
J.._
> , aL = ------;::CI + V,j
1

and aH is the unique value of a that satisfies [a'Y (p

+ C2) 21

(49)

..1

, qv = qF0-' ,

C2] + (0 7

~

-,

~

< aH <

(

b2 )-'
--b
'
P+ 2

-1) (a'YcI - C2) = O.

Proof. In appendix.

Recall that since stores intend to induce a purchase by every buyer who has positive valuation for the
good, they choose prices by considering the preferences of low valuation buyers. The wider the gap between
high and low valuation (the smaller the a) the lower the price to be posted and the higher the quantity to
be produced per sale. Because sellers must obtain a positive surplus from each transaction, however, they
will not find it worthwhile selling to all prospective buyers if this entails production of too large quantities
of output (a> ad. Buyers, on the other hand, expect to obtain positive surplus only from a liN fraction
of the stores visited. The value attached to money holdings, therefore, depends only on the surplus obtained
when the preferred commodity is acquired. Since the size of this surplus is inversely related to a, it follows
that a cannot be too small either (a < aH). Furthermore, sellers won't produce at all if they are too
impatient because money receipts can only be used only in future purchases. This explains why the rate of
time discounting cannot be too high (p < PH)'
Clearly to be an equilibrium {qh, qF} must support the proposed

11".

strategies listed in (32). We do so

in the next lemma where we also provide a condition sufficient to support (43), in which case currency F is
valued more by domestic than foreign sellers.

Lemma 2. When the conditions listed in lemma 1 hold and {qh, qF} is the equilibrium production vector,
then IId = 1 Vd, II; = 1, and there exists some k 2: k'

> 0 and P E [0.5,1) such that if M D :5 2P - 1 then

VF - ~ 2: V; - V;.
Proof. In appendix.

Interestingly, we note that the sufficient condition for foreign money to be valued relatively more by
domestic sellers does not require the existence of a substantial degree of economic integration between the
two countries. Rather, it requires a lack of domestic liquidity. When P 2: 0.5 and k 2: k' the domestic
economy is larger (relative to the foreign) and trade matches with domestic buyers are more likely (than
with foreign buyers). However, if the domestic money supply is low (MD :5 2P - 1) the domestic sellers
will prize the foreign currency more than foreign sellers. Finally, we provide sufficient conditions such that

{qh, qF} is consistent with sellers' maximization of profits, and foreign sellers do not accept currency D.
Lemma 3. When the conditions listed in lemmas 1-2 hold and {qh,qF} is the equilibrium production
vector, then if a is in a neighborhood of aL and k' is sufficiently small then (i) qh satisfies (20) for domestic
sellers (ii) if VF - ~ = V; - V; then qF satisfies (20) for both domestic and foreign sellers, and (iii) II~ = O.

Proof. In appendix.
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An existence proposition follows.

Proposition 2.

The conditions set forth in lemmas 1-3 are sufficient for the existence of a unique

equilibrium where only one currency circulates internationally (currency F), and where prices of identical
commodities are identical across countries even if the equilibrium valuation of the two currencies may differ
across countries.
Proof. See Appendix.

We illustrate the proposition with the help of figure 1. The equilibrium where currency substitution takes
place in the domestic economy corresponds to the dotted area. It arises only when the domestic stock of
liquidity is sufficiently low, and does not coexist with the one with only local currencies. Because of this
lack of liquidity domestic stores would rather sell less frequently but charge premium prices by extracting all
surplus of the high valuation buyers (destroying the monetary equilibrium). The lack of liquidity, however,
can be lessened if domestic traders would adopt also the foreign currency in their transactions. Even if
foreign trade is subject to substantial frictions (aD

= 7.5 > aF = 0.0625) currency substitution enlarges the

extent of the market and keeps the stores from posting premium prices in an illiquid economy. Note from
the picture that the foreign economy has "sufficient" liquidity (P = 0.75 and M F > MD in the area where
the equilibrium exists) so that, given the extent of international trade frictions, foreign sellers do not find it
worthwhile to use both currencies as media of exchange.
Interestingly, the international currency has identical purchasing power in both countries, even if they
are very different economies. Because of the existence of substantial international trade frictions, however,
the two currencies are not perfect substitutes in that there is a "home goods bias" (q'D > qj;.). This is
because domestic stores value the local currency more since the frequency of trade it allows is greater than
the competing money.

5.3 Two international currencies.
We now prove the existence of equilibria where currency substitution takes place in both economies

1TD = 1Tp = 1T'; = 1T';; = 1,

(50)

in which case any store posts prices in terms of both currencies. Because buyers can buy locally or abroad,
seller i

V

=1=

+1

considers both the foreign and domestic demand in choosing Qd,i' However, since in general

V', the seller can choose to post one of four possible quantity offers for each denomination:

23

AB explained in the previous section, none of these quantities can be ruled out a priori, not even the smallest.
Even if, say, domestic sellers obtained the entire surplus generated by d-denominated trades, foreign buyers
could still be able to get a positive surplus, sometimes, if foreign sellers posted lower prices. Clearly, monetary
equilibria in which all stores post the highest price could not be supported (in which case Vet,. = VJ,. = 0),
but several other possible combinations of prices can be conjectured (4 4

-

1). The set of possible outcomes,

however, is once again greatly reduced when we consider the simple class of equilibria where every store sells
to every buyer who desires the good. This implies that stores in both countries post the lowest d-denominated
price (highest possible quantity).
The gains from trade for buyer h, however, still depend on his nationality because the returns from
holding d may differ in different locations (due to dissimilar market frictions, for instance). For this reason
(and since X~,i

== Xet,i)

the optimal quantity offer must generally satisfy

qd = rt.*

such that

Ui-l (qd,.)

= max {Vet,i-l - ~,'-l, V~,i-l - V;,i-d Vd, i,

(51)

so that any buyer h E {i - 2, i-I} holding d buys from any stores i :
(52)
When the equilibrium strategies 7r* and ,8*satisfy (50) and (52), and qd satisfies (51), then (7)-(9) and
(5) imply the distribution of money
(53)
hence m = m' = M. This and (1), (12)-(13), in turn imply the value functions
(54)

(55)
and since in general Vet -

v;. "# VJ - V;,

then (14)-(15) imply
(56)

pVJ = (1 - m)(Q~ + Q~) [2 (V;

- VJ) + (qd)'Y + (aqdn,

(57)

for all d.
Unfortunately (54)-(57) do not tell us the relative size of Vet - VB vs.

V~

- V;, so that we cannot pin

down a unique equilibrium quantity using (51). Once again we conjecture (and then verify) the existence of
an equilibrium where it is the domestic stores that have the largest net return from holding each currency,
Vd

-

~

2:: VJ - V; > 0 Vd, so that (51) implies
(58)

24

Using this "pricing rule", we prove the following.

Proposition 3. There exists a unique equilibrium with currency substitution where qd

= q~. = q*

Vd, if

m satisfies (53), and the following sufficient conditions hold:
{m = m' E (m,m), P ~ P},
with

= (O:D + O:F)

p=min{PDl,PFl}, PD l -

+ (2 - a) (1 - m - a'Y)]
(2-a)a'Y

[mal+'Y

and PFl is the unique positive value of P that solves
(q*)l-'Y

=

(o:~ + o:~)(1 - m)(1 + a'Y)
.
p(2 - a) + 2(o:~ + o:~)(2 - a - m)

Corollary. Equilibria where both currencies are international may coexist with equilibria without cur-

rency substitution, but the former also exist on regions of the parameter space which do not support the latter.
Thus the possibility of currency substitution may raise welfare.
Proof. In Appendix.

The union of the black, white and dotted areas in figure 1 represents the region which supports the
equilibrium discussed in this section. It clearly coexists with the two types of equilibria with partial and
no currency substitution. Note, for instance, that even if the equilibrium with two local currencies does
not exists for too small domestic or foreign money stocks, an equilibrium where both currencies circulate
internationally does. This because by using both denominations for both local and international trade the
extent of the market increases for both local and foreign sellers. This generates a greater frequency of
trade and allows individual stores to post lower prices. Similarly, an equilibrium with two international
currencies exists for currency stocks larger than the one delimiting the area of existence of the two local
currency equilibrium. Larger foreign currency stocks make it optimal for domestic sellers to accept the
foreign currency (and vice-versa) as long as every stores posts prices in both denominations. Because the
two currencies are substitutable, however, as the aggregate stock of moneys rises prices in both countries will
drop.
While we focus on a simple class of equilibria where currency substitution takes place and the international
currency has identical purchasing power in both countries, multiple equilibria with currency substitution may
exist outside of this class. Whereas attempting to characterize all of them analytically is a daunting task,
we provide some examples of what we think are interesting outcomes. Figure 2 in particular, shows that
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on some regions of the parameter space there are equilibria with international price dispersion in that each
national currency has a larger purchasing power abroad. These equilibria are interesting because they are
symmetric, and because they coexist with equilibria without price dispersion.

6. Concluding remarks.
We have considered existence of monetary equilibria in a two-country, two-currencies world with endogenous price formation by means of a seller-posting-price protocol. We have proved the existence of a unique
equilibrium where domestic trade is entirely facilitated by domestic currency. In this case our preliminary
findings show that, in contrast to earlier random matching models of money, symmetric monetary equilibria
may exist only on a subset of the support of the distribution of money, and only if individuals are sufficiently
patient. Interestingly we find that, under certain conditions, this pricing mechanism allows for the possibility that stores post efficient prices, in the sense that the equilibrium prices are identical to the one a social
planner would choose. Additionally, we have shown that if the money supply is too large or too small sellers
would find it optimal to price discriminate against the low valuation buyers, and extract all trade surplus
from the high valuation buyers. This, in turn, would deprive money of its value and shut down trade. We
have shown that in this case currency substitution could be prove to be socially beneficial in the sense that
it would allow the achievement of Pareto superior allocations where trade occurs.
By considering a simple class of equilibria where every store posts identical prices, we have proved the
existence of an outcome where the sale of domestic output is facilitated by both the domestic and the foreign
currency, but not vice-versa. In this context, we have shown the existence of "home good bias", in that the
domestic currency may have a larger purchasing power because of international trade frictions. This may
occur even if the net return from holding the foreign currency is larger in the domestic economy, then abroad.
We have also shown that there are equilibria in which currency substitution takes place in both economies,
they are perfect substitutes and their purchasing power is identical across economies. Interestingly, this may
occur despite the presence of both international trade frictions and substantial asymmetries in the economic
fundamentals of the two countries. Numerically, we have shown that equilibria with currency substitution
may be multiple, and may entail price dispersion across countries on certain regions of the parameter space.
We consider this study as a first step in the direction of a better understanding of the phenomenon of
currency substitution. In future research we intend to develop this model further to investigate the effect
that currency substitution has on both prices and volume of trade, and ultimately welfare.
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Appendix

Suboptimality of

Qd,i-l

leaving all potential buyers with some positive surplus.
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Note first that offers larger than the one leaving zero surplus to buyers with the lowest valuation for
good i - I , are not an equilibrium: a larger quantity offered would not increase the probability of a sale,
while raising production costs in all other possible trades. That is Qd,i-l :$ Qd,i_lwhere Qd,i-l satisfies

due to our description of preferences and since both domestic and foreign buyers may hold currency d. 21 To
consider the strictest possible case, suppose that Qd,i-l satisfies Vd.i - Qd,i-l - V.,i > 0, so sellers would sell
for any Qd,i-l < Qd,i-l (since their payoff is positive). Then (omitting the indices d and i - I where they
are understood), pick any two offers QL < QH < Q, such that they take away the.surplus from two adjacent

types of buyers: a low valuation buyer in the case of Q H and the next higher valuation buyer in the case of
QL'
We now show that the profit function O(Q) is strictly decreasing on Q E [QL, QH]' Let also
_ aDmd + aFm~ "
Dd•i- 1 =
N
L..J [(3d,h(Qd,i-l)

' ]
+ (3d,h(Qd.i-l)

hEN

denote the expected demand for the commodity i - I when sold at price Qd~-l . For ease of notation omit
the subscripts d and i - I from D, hence we write the profit function as
O(Q) == D(Vd - Q -~)
for any Q. Define also the convex combination Q>. == AQ L + (1- A)QH for some A E (0,1). We now show that
offering Q>. is worse than at least offering Q L or QH. Because of their definition, Q Land Q H are "adjacent
offers" , that is

i.e. only if the quantity is increased to QH more buyers will buy. Thus

But then, if max {O(Q L), O(Q H)}
QL.QH

= O(Q L), then Q>. is a choice dominated at least by Q L, while if

max {O(Qd,O(QH)} = O(QH) then Q>. is dominated by both QL and QH .•

QL.QH

Proof of Proposition 1.
21 Recall

V:,i -

V~,i

that in· a monetary equilibrium, for money to valued there must at least be one of the differences V.,i - Vd,i or
which is strictly negative. Hence the min{-} function.

Furthermore, buyer h = i

+ 1 is the one who

has the lowest positive valuation for good i - I , since ah,i-l is an increasing

< aHl,i-l.
satisfy min{V.,i - Vd,i, V:,i - V~,;} + Ui (Qd,i-l) < 0 .
sequence for h ~ i (h mod N) with 0 = ai,i-l

Thus
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Ui (Qd,i-l)

= O. But then, a monetary equilibrium must

We only discuss the case for domestic traders (the case of foreign traders is identical). In equilibrium,
using (27), (30), (31), (28), and (26),

qiJaD [(qiJr'-l (1 - m) + 2m]
VD -

~ =

(59)

.

p+aD(1+m)

Equilibrium quantities. Using (59) and (28) in equilibrium
* _{a'Y[p+aD(I+m)]-aD(I-m)}~
%2maD
.

(60)

Similarly, a foreign seller posts the quantity
-L.

q'* = {a'Y [p + a~(1 + m')] - a~(1 - m')} 1-",

•

(61)

2m'a'F

F

> 0 is

A sufficient (but not necessary) condition for qiJ, q';

1 - a'Y

m',m > m == 1 +a'Y

E (0,1).

Buyer's strategies. It is easily verified that ,B'D,i(qiJ,h) = 1 'r/i and h = i,i + 1, since the equilibrium q*
satisfies (28).

Seller's strategies.
(i) 7riJ = 1. Using (22), given that qiJ satisfies (28), and given (29), IliJ = 1 whenever qiJ < ij. This because

VD - qiJ - ~ > 0, in equilibrium is just (aqiJ)'Y - qiJ > 0, i.e. (qiJ)l-'Y < a'Y.
(ii) QiJ maximizes n(QiJ)· Taking as given the value functions, the expected profit from charging the low

price must be the highest. Using (20) this is equivalent to

[

~

(VD

VD - (VD - VB)'" - ~ :5 2 VD which, using (28), is satisfied whenever (qiJ)l-'Y :5

2':.a.'

-

a

~]
- ~

~)",

Note that if the latter inequality is satisfied

this also guarantees qiJ < ij (seller's surplus is positive), since (qiJ)l-'Y :5
in (qiJ)l-'Y :5

2':.a.

,

2':.a. < a'Y.

and rearranging we obtain

aD (maI+'Y + (2 - a) (1 - m - a'Y)] ~ (2 - a)a'Y p.
Since maI+'Y + (2 - a) (1 - m - a'Y)
m

> 0 only if
(2 - a)(1 - a'Y)

< m == 2 - a(I + a'Y)

E (0,1),

then qiJ maximizes n(qiJ) only if

<
=
P-PD-

?D

[maI+'Y + (2 - a)(1 - m - a'Y)]
and
(2-a)a'Y

These conditions are:
29

m<m.

Substituting (60)

• Necessary for Q D to maximize profits, when it satisfies (28)
• Sufficient to guarantee
It is easy to show that as a

qD < q so that lID =

-+

1 then in

-+

1.

1/2 (by L'Hospital rule), that both m and in are decreasing

in a, and that m < in Va. Therefore there are M D that satisfy m E (m, in) Va, P. Additionally,
because PD > 0 there are 0 < P ~ PD' In a similar manner II; = 1 and q; maximizes
when m' < in and P -< PF

==

n' (q;)

only

c/ rm'al+""+(2-a)(1-m'-a"")]
F
(2 a)a""
. Finally, if

these conditions are sufficient for

lID = II; = 1, and necessary for qD

andq; to satisfy (20) thus be

the profit maximizing quantities.
(iii) 7r} = O. Using (22) there must be no quantity in XF,i-l the seller would like to produce in exchange for

currency F, given the conjectured distribution, value functions, prices, and strategies. In principle a
domestic seller could sell for currency F to either a domestic or a foreign buyer. However, since mF = 0
domestic sellers expect to meet none of the former, only the latter. Thus, in case the seller deviates
to IIF = 1, the only (potentially) worthwhile production choices are QF = ~(V;
QF =

(V; - V;)lh == aq';'.

-

V;)lh

== q';' or

Since some foreign buyers (the high valuation ones) would buy when offered

the smallest quantity aq';' (the highest possible price), then the deviation would offer the possibility
to sell to some, at the highest possible price. Clearly eve if by doing so the surplus from trade is
non-positive, then the seller would not deviate and choose II F = 1. Therefore a sufficient condition for
II} = 0 is
(62)
Out-of-equilibrium, a domestic buyer i holding foreign currency has a lifetime utility which satisfies

(63)
One problem with the functional equation above is that it contains strategies BF,i(q';.,h) which, as
complete contingent plans, define actions never observed along the equilibrium path: we don't know
if the domestic buyer with F buys from a foreign seller and at what price. However we know that if
VF - ~ ~ aq';. (as required by (62)) then VF - VB

< (aq';')'" because (aq';.)'" > aq';. (since aq';. < 1).

This has implications for the out-of-equilibrium moves of domestic buyers with F : buyer i will buy all
commodities i and i

+ 1 offered, i.e.

Now there are two cases: (i) aq';'

B},i(q';.,h) = 1 h = 1, i

~ VF - VB

+ 1.

> 0, or (ii) aq';. > 0

~ VF - ~.

In the second instance

domestic buyers with F would always buy (B},i(q';.,h) = 1 Vh) even if consumption of the commodity
offered did not provide any utility (recall that there is no free disposal of money so by buying individuals
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throwaway their unwanted money). Suppose that VF - ~ > O. Then using B;',i(q~,h) = 1 h = 1, i
and (63) implies:

pVF

= of(1 - m~) [2~ - 2VF + (q;

r

(1

+ a1')]

+1
(64)

which, together with (28) and (30), implies

(VF - Vs) [p + 20 F (I-

m~)] = of(I- m~) (q;

It is easy to show that the inequality aq';

_ _

OF < OF
where a

=

~

r

(1

+ a1') -

20DmD [(aqj)1' - qj)].

(65)

VF - Vs can be rearranged as

20 D m

[(aqj)1' - qj)]

+ paq';

(1 - m' ) (q;f [1 + a1' - 2a1' (q';)l-1'}

> 0 because 1 + a1' - 2a1' (q~)l-1' > 0 (its smallest value, achieved at q';

= 1, is positive).

Note that aF is a number since it is a function only of parameters (qj) and q'; are determined by (60)
and (61».
Furthermore VF

-

Vs > 0 whenever the right hand side of (65) is non-positive:
_
20 D m [(aqj)1' - qj)]
OF :5 °F2 = (1- m') (q;)1' (1 + a1')'

Clearly

0F2

(66)

< aF. Therefore:

• aq'; ~ VF - Vs > 0 if OF E (OF2' aF)' This implies II;' = 0 and q;' = O.
• aq'; > 0 ~ VF - ~ if OF < 0F2 < aF. This also implies II;'

= 0 and q;' = O.

We conclude that OF < aF is sufficient for II;' = 0 and q;' = O. Similarly, for a foreign seller a sufficient
condition for

lID =

q'v =

0 is

0D < aD' where

_
oD
==

r-

20' m' [(aq'*
q't] + paq*
F
F
F
D.
(1 - m) (qj)1' [1 + a1' - 2a1' (qh)l-1']

(67)

Clearly, because of (6) there are k ' which satisfy both (66) and (67) .•

Proof of Corollary to Proposition 1.

Prices decreasing in the money supply. Using the definition for qj), mD = m,

m~ =

m / , it is easy to see

that ~ > 0 if p :5 "'D(~~a-r). Additionally
PD

<

oD(1 - a1')

a1'

,

so that since p :5 PD is necessary for existence of an equilibrium with two local currencies, then ~

> O. A

similar procedure is used to prove that ~ > O. The statement in the corollary follows from our definition
of "price" in terms of currency d, i.e. q~'
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Efficient prices. Consider a domestic seller and for convenience let k' = 0 so that non-local trade is ruled
out. An offer is efficient if it solves the social planner's problem of maximizing the ex-ante lifetime utility of
individuals in each country, denoted by
pW = mpVD

+ (1- m)p~,

by choice of qD, while taking as given the trading arrangements. By substituting the equilibrium value
functions (30) and (31), we obtain
aD(1 - m)m [ ( "I
)(
pW = p + aD(1 + m) 2 qD - qD aD

)

+P

"I I

- pqD ,

which is concave in qD since

and

~W

uqD

ex

2'Yb -

lkb- 2 (aD

+ p) - 'Yb -

It is easy to see that the first order condition implies that if aD

l)q1- 2 < O.

+ p > 1/2 then the efficient quantity must

satisfy

_{'Y[2(aD+p)-I)}~
2(aD + p)

e

qD = qD =

Using (60), qv = qh if
e

m = m

(aD + p) [aD - a"l(aD + p)]
aD [(aD + p)(1 + a"l - 2')') + 'Y]'

=

A similar discussion leads to the definition of
'e _

m

=

(a~

+ p) [a~ -

a"l(a~

a~ [(a~ + p)(1 + a"l -

+ p))
+ 'YI'

2'Y)

for the foreign country. It is easy to see that m'e, me E (m, m) for p > 0 small and aD, a~ in a neighborhood
of one. If k' is sufficiently small, then all conditions set in proposition 1 hold.•

Proof of Lemma 1
In what follows we provide conditions sufficient to guarantee the existence and uniqueness of a positive
fixed point (qv, qp.) on a subset of (0, q)2.
1. Finding the fixed point. Letting XD = (aqDr - qD, and XF = (aqF)"I - qF, rewrite (48) by adding and

subtracting (aqD)"I to the right hand side of the second equation, and (aqF)"I to the second:
(qDr
{ (qF)"I

[a"Yb6s-b2] + ~XF =
[a"Yc64-c2] + ~XD =
32

-XD

+ (aqD)"I

-XF

+ (aqF)"I .

Rearranging

)"1
{(q D
(q F )"1

[a"l'(bl-bS>-b2]
+U X +X =0
bs
bs F
D
[a"l'(C1-b4>-C2]
b4

+ £aX
b4 D

+X F =0.

Solve for x D from the second equation

and plug it into the first to obtain

• _
[a"l(Cl - b4 ) - C2]
qD - qF a"l(b1 - b:3) _ ~
Note that

Cl -

b4

>

b1

~
"I'

b:3 > 0, and that

-

Cl -

b4 = P + 0D (1 - m)

+ OF (1 -

b1

b:3 = p + oD(1

== p +~.

-

- m)

m~)

== p + C2

Therefore let

6 = a"l(p + C2) - C2
- a"l(p+b2) -

~

and rewrite
(68)
Note that since ~+c
>
P C2

+b2 ,
P b2

then 6 > 0 either if

a> ( -C2- )~ ,or a<
P+C2
Additionally, 6 < 1 if a >

(P~~2)

~

"I'

(p~~)~
~

(because C2 >

~) and 6 > 1 if a < (p~2b2) otherwise (because
"I'

the negative numerator would be larger, in absolute value, than the negative denominator). Using qD
from (68) into the second equation of the system yields
(69)

2. Conditions for

q; > 0 and q; < ij.

• q'F < ij : This inequality is satisfied if

If a > (p~2C2)

~
"I'

then 6 < 1, the left hand side is positive, but the right hand is negative. Therefore

we need a < (p~2b2)

~

"I' ,

in which case 6 > 1, the left had side is negative while the right hand side

is positive, so that the inequality is always satisfied.
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• q~ > 0 'Vd : Note that since C1 > £:2, and 8> 1, a sufficient condition for qj;. > 0 is

a~aL= (~)~
C1 + b3
~

It is easy to show that a L <

(p~2bJ" if
P

• qiJ < ij:

< PH

_ b2 (b4
=

+ ~)
k_'

£:2-"2

Using (68) and (69) this inequality can be rearranged as

I.e.

yielding

+ (8 7 -

[a l' (p + £:2) - C2]
~

Note that when P < PH' aL

~

1) (a

l' C1

-

C2) <

.

< (p~2b2)" < (p~2CJ" Therefore, if a =

O.

(70)

aL then the left hand side
~

of (70) is strictly negative since (a1'c1 - C2)
then a1' (p + C2) - C2

< 0 and a1' (p + C2) -C2 < O. When aL < a < (p~2b2)"
~

< 0 still holds. As

a --+

(p~2b2)" then 8

--+ 00

so that the left hand side

of (70) is strictly positive. By the intermediate value theorem it follows that there exists an
aH

E(a L ' (p~2bJ ~) such that [a1' (p + C2) -

C2]

+ (8 7 -

1) (a1'c1 -

C2)

~ 0 for all a ~ aH.

Therefore (70) is satisfied for all a E (aL' aH) . •

Proof of Lemma 2.
1. Conditions for

is (aqd)'Y
q~.

i.e.

lId = 1

'Vd. In this equilibrium the proposed quantity offers satisfy (28) and (44), that

= Vd - V. 'Vd.

q~

<

From (22),

lId = 1 only if sellers have a positive trade surplus after producing

ij. We have shown that this inequality is satisfied when the conditions listed in lemma 1

hold.
2. Condition for II; = 1. Note that qj;. < ij is not sufficient to guarantee that foreign sellers sell for

currency F, II; = 1. This because we have conjectured that VF -

V.

~ V; - V; (we will provide

conditions for this to hold in the following subsection). Therefore, we must find a condition supporting

V; - V;

>

qj;. (in which case foreign sellers have a positive surplus from trade, which satisfies (22)).

Using (47) this inequality is rearranged as
( * )1-1'
qF

d2

< d1 - d3

_

=

(1 + a1') [a~(l- m) + a~(l- m~)l
P + 2 [a~(l - m) + a~(1- m~)l '
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whose right hand side is maximized at p = 0, becoming (l-+;a"). Since the upper bound of the left hand
side is q, then the inequality is always satisfied because a"l

3. Condition for VF - ~ ~ Vj;. -

a

<

(l+2 ").

v:. We must find a condition supporting (aqi-T

~ Vj;. - V:. Using (47)

this inequality is
* )1-"1
( qF

< a"ld1 d

-

3

The RHS of this inequality must be positive, that is

_ [
a> aLF =

d2

(71)

.

a"dJ;d:> > 0, which can be rearranged as

a'o (1 - m) + a~ (1 - m~ )
]~
p + a'o(1- mD + mF) + a~(1 + m~) . .

Because of the equilibrium requirement listed earlier a sufficient condition for the RHS of (71) to be
positive is aLF

~ aL,

an inequality that, after some algebra, amounts to
p(k - k') [(1- P)(l-

m~) - (1 -

m)P]

~ O.

(72)

Using (3), (4), the equilibrium distribution of (37), (and recalling that M D < P), then

/
1-mF=

(1- M D - M F )
(l-MD)

/)
- (P - MD) (1
1 -mP
-mF'

> k', the LHS of (72) is negative whenever M D < 2P - 1 (which obviously also
requires P > 0.5). IT k < k', the LHS of (72) is negative whenever M D > 2P - 1. Therefore (72) (and

It follows that if k

hence the positivity of the RHS of (71)) is satisfied whenever,

MD>2P-1,
ifk<k'
{ M D ~ 2P - 1 and P ~ ~, if k ~ k'.

(73)

Finally, we note that when a - aL then the LHS of (71) converges to
a"lb3(0

b4

- 1)

+ ~o".1

'

and (using the definition of 0) note that as k'(l - P) - 0, then

C2 -

~ so that 0 -

there exists large P and small k' such that (71) is satisfied for some a E (aL' aH ) .•

Proof of Lemma 3.
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1. By continuity

To show that profits are maximized, by choosing
the profit functions f2(Qd) and

f2'(Q~)

qd

satisfying Lemma 1 and (28) and (44), we consider

under all possible one-time deviations in offers, taking as given value

functions, distributions and prices in all other matches. 22
1. Currency D, Domestic Seller. f2(QD) must be maximized when qiJ satisfies (49). Offering a higher

quantity is not an equilibrium since the probability of a sale would not increase. The only possible
deviation is offering QD

= aqiJ which, given (33) and (28), takes away the surplus form

all domestic

buyers with D. No deviation occurs if f2(qiJ) > f2(aqiJ) ,which under the conjectured strategies amounts
to
(

• )1-"Y

qD

a"Y

< 2-

(74)

a

(see proof of proposition 1). Substitution of qiJ from (49) implies

and since a minimum for qj;. is obtained when a = aL, in which case rearrange the inequality above as

The left hand side of this latter inequality is non-positive whenever (6 - 1)(2 - aL)6- 1

1, or

-

2- aL

6<--.
-

l-aL

Since a minimum for (2 - aL)/(1 - aL) is given by 2, and since 6

--+

1 as k'(1 - P)

--+

0 then there

exists a sufficiently small k' that satisfies (74) when a is in a right neighborhood of aL.
2. II~ = O. From (22) we need to show that S'(Q'v) $ 0, Q'v E X'v. Since 7r~ = 0, m'v = 0, and
nationality is private information, a foreign seller meeting a buyer with D expects her to be a domestic
trader. Thus we must show that the foreign seller's surplus form deviating (accepting D) is non-positive
even when he offers the smallest quantity Q'v == aqiJ at which some domestic buyer with D would buy.
A sufficient condition for II~ = 0 is then
(75)

Vi:> - aqiJ - V: $ O.
Out of equilibrium, a foreign buyer i holding currency D has a lifetime utility which satisfies

(76)
22 Since

a domestic seller chooses both QD and QF, she could simultaneously deviate from both

We do not consider this type of deviations, but only one quantity at a time.
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qh and qj,. for one period.
I

We know that if (75) holds, then Vb -

v; < (aqh)"Y

because aqh < 1. As previously done (see proof

of Porpositionl) there are two cases to consider: (i) aqh ~ Vb - V; > 0 or (ii) aqh > 0 ~ Vb - V;.
Suppose Vb - V:

> O. Then Bb,i(qh,h)

= 1 only for h = i, i

+ 1 and (76) implies

pVb = a'o(l - m) [2V: - 2Vb + (qh)"Y (1 + a"Y)] .

(77)

Using (28) and (39)

(Vb - V:) [p + 2a'o(1- m)] = a'o(l - m) (qh)"Y (1

+ a"Y) -

2 (a'omF

+ a~m~) (Vf -

V: - q}) (78)

where Vf - V; in equilibrium is a function of qj;., defined by (47). Clearly, the most restrictive case for
(75) to hold is when Vb - V: is the largest, which occurs when Vf - V: - qj;. ::::: 0 in which case (75) is
rearranged as

(q$ )1-"Y >
D

Rearranging

a' <
D-

-

a'o(l - m)
P + 2a'o (1 - m)

. _l_+_a_"Y
a

)1-"Y
ap qD
(l-m) [1+a"Y-2ap(qh)1-"Y]'
$

(79)

(

It is easy to prove that l+a"Y -2ap (qh)l-"Y > 0 always, since qh < ii, therefore there exists a sufficiently

small k' that satisfies both (79) and (74), and hence (75).

3. Currency F, domestic and foreign sellers. Restrict attention to the case Vf - V; = VF - Vo, which
we know exists (see lemma 2) for some choice of the parameters. From (20), S1(QF) and S1'(QF) must
be maximized when q} satisfies (44). Equilibrium profits are:

Since here we are assuming Vf - V; = VF sellers (domestic or foreign) QF = aqj;.

Vo, only one other possible quantity can be offered by a

== (VF - Vs)~ . The deviation profits are

+'

S1'(Q~) = aDmF N aFm F (Vf - aqj;. - V:).
I

In the expression above Vf - V;

S1(qj;.) > S1(QF) if qj;. <

2a:.o.'

I

= (aqj;. r ,and it is easy to verify that qj;. satisfies S1' (qj;.)

This latter requirement is always satisfied because qj;.

we have shown above that in equilibrium (qh)l-"Y

Proof of Proposition 2.
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<

2a:.o.'.

> S1' (Q~), and

< qh by (49), and

This follows from lemmas 1 through 3 and implies Vj;. - V;

= VF -

~.

By continuity, similar equilibria

exists in a neighborhood of the parameterization chosen.•

Proof of Proposition 3.
The format of this proof is quite similar to the proof of proposition one, and we will focus on domestic
sellers and buyers. In equilibrium, using (50)-(53), the "pricing rule" (58), then (56) implies

Since m = m'

pVD = (1- m)(oD

+ OF) [~- VD + (qv)")'j

pVF = (1- m)(oD

+ OF) [~- VF + (qj;.)")'].

= M in equilibrium, by defining the constants
ho =p+ (1

h 2 = 2(OD

+ mD -

+ OF),

mF)(oD

+ OF),

h 3 = P + (1

hI = (1- m)(oD

+ mF -

mD)(OD

+ OF),

+ OF),

then

(VD -~) h o = hI (qv)")'
(VF - ~) h 3 = hI (q:F)")'

+ h2 (mDqv + mFqj;.) -

+ ~ (mDqv + mFq:F) -

~mF (VF -~)

h 2 mD (VD - ~).

Because of the way prices are formed we can rewrite the system of equations above as

(aqvr h o = hI (qv)")'

+ ~ (mDqv + mFq:F) -

h 2 mF (aqj;.)")'

{ (aq:F)")' h 3 = hI (qj;.)")' + h 2 (mDqh + mFqj;.) - h 2 mD (aqh)")'·

(80)

Equilibrium quantities. Using (80) there is a non monetary equilibrium q; = 0 for all d. Subtracting the
second from the first equation in (80) we obtain

which implies that as long as
~

I

(aD + of)(1 - m) ]..,
a
lP+(OD+oF)(I-m)
,
there is a unique monetary equilibrium where qh = q'F = q", with

=I-

q" = {a")' [p + (aD

+ OF )(1 + m)] -

(aD
2m(aD +aF)

A sufficient (but not necessary) condition for q"

+ aF)(1 -

-l-

m)} 1-.., .

(81)

> 0 is

m>m·
Buyer's strategies. It is easily verified that .8~,i(q;.h) = 1 Vd, i and h = i, i
satisfies (58).

Sellers' strategies.
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+ 1, since the equilibrium q"

(i) 71"d

= 1.

Since in this equilibrium VD

and given (52), it follows that

-

lId =

v.. = V

F -

v.., then using (22), given that qd = q. satisfies (81),

1 whenever q.

< ij.

(ii) q. maximizes n(q·). Taking as given the value functions, the expected profit from charging the low
price must be the highest. Using (20) this is equivalent to

which, using (28), is satisfied whenever (q.)l-'Y ~

2a:.a'

Note that if the latter inequality is satisfied

this also guarantees q. < ij. Substituting (81) in (q.)1-'Y ~

2':.4 and rearranging we obtain

(aD + aF) [ma H , + (2 - a) (1 - m - a"Y)] ~ (2 - a)a"Y p.
It follows that q. maximizes n(q·) only if

<

= (aD+aF)
p - Pm -

[ma H '+(2-a)(I-m-a"Y)]
(2 - a)a'

and m < m.

These conditions are necessary for Q d to maximize profits for all d (when Q d satisfies (58)), and are

qd < ij so that lId = 1 Vd. Recall (from the proof of proposition 1) that as a-I
both m and m are decreasing in a, and that m < m Va. Therefore there are M D

sufficient to guarantee
then

m-

1/2, that

and M F that satisfy m E (m, m) Va.
(iii)

71"~

= 1 Vd,

and q. maximizes n'(q·). Since q'D

= q'; = q.

and m

= m',then in equilibrium

V' _ V' = (a~ + a~) [(1 - m)(1 + a'Y) (q.)'Y + 2mq·] ,
d

P + 2(a~

8

+ a~)

Vd.

(82)

It follows that II~· = 1 Vd if V~ - V; > q., rearranged as

( .. )l-"Y
(1 + a'Y)(1 - m)(a~ + a~)
q
< p+2(I-m)(a'D+ a p) ,
whose right hand side is maximized at P = 0, in which case it becomes 0+24 "1). However, since the
upper bound of the left hand side is ii, then the inequality is always satisfied because a'Y < (H~t"l).
Finally q. maximizes n'(q·) whenever deviating to charge aq· does not increase the expected profit,
Le.

V~

- aq· - V; :::; 2 [V~ - q. - V;]. Using (82) this inequality can be rearranged as
(a~ + ap)(1 - m)(1 + a'Y)
,
- p(2-a)+2(a~+ap)(2-a-m)

( .)1-, <
q

which is seen to be satisfied with equality by a unique PFl > 0 small (q. increases in p). It follows that
if

P:::;
these conditions are sufficient for

P== min {PDl,PFl}

lId = II~· = 1 Vd,

quantity for both domestic and foreign sellers.
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and

m <m

and necessary for q. to be the profit maximizing

(iv) Vd

-

Vs

~

VJ - V;. Using (58), (81), and (82) this inequality can be rearranged as

p [a~

+ a~ -

(aD

+ OF)]

+ a~)(aD + aF)(l- m),

~ 2(a~

an inequality satisfied by the sufficient condition
P~0.5

and

k~k/,

for all p > 0 (by some p sufficiently small, otherwise).•

Proof of Corollary to Proposition 3.

Coexistence follows from comparison of the conditions required for the existence of equilibria with two
local currencies. Note that for p > 0 small, the region of the parameter space supporting the equilibria with
local currencies is a subset of the parameter space supporting equilibria with two international currencies.
Note that in the case of two local currencies m = M D / P, whereas in the case of two international

+ M F . Recall that the equilibriwn with two international
M D + M F > m the two international currencies equilibriwn

currencies m = M D

currencies does not exist

if M D < mP. IT

exists. It follows that if

M D E (m - MF,mP) an equilibriwn with two international currencies exists, whereas the equilibriwn with

two local currencies does not. It follows that on this region of the parameter space the former equilibriwn is
clearly a Pareto superior outcome.•
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Figure 2: Equilibria with currency substitution and international price dispersion
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